Simmel	and	Mannheim	on	the	Sociology	of	Philosophy,	Historicism	and	Relativism1 Martin	Kusch 1.	Introduction This	paper	identifies	and	evaluates	some	central	relativistic	and	historicist	themes	in	earlytwentieth-century	German	sociology	of	knowledge.	The	two	main	figures	are	Georg	Simmel (1858-1918)	and	Karl	Mannheim (1893-1947). Concentrating	on	Simmel	and	Mannheim	might	seem	surprising	in	a	volume	focussed on	philosophical	positions	concerning	relativism.	Indeed,	Simmel	and	Mannheim	are	today primarily	remembered	as	amongst	the	most	influential	'founding	fathers'	of	the	social sciences.	It	is	important,	however,	to	remember	that	the	two	men	worked	in	an	academic world	in	which	the	borders	between	philosophy	and	the	social	sciences	were	unclear	and open	(cf.	Goodstein	2017).	Moreover,	Simmel	never	held	a	chair	in	sociology	and	did	not think	of	himself	as	a	sociologist.	And	both	thinkers	put	forward	ideas	and	theories	that were	recognized	as	philosophical	and	sociological	by	their	contemporaries. Neither	'relativism'	nor	'historicism'	had	a	precise	and	agreed-upon	meaning	in	earlytwentieth-century	debates.	Still,	put	in	very	general	terms,	'relativism'	referred	to	the denial	of	truths	that	are	universal,	fixed,	and	independent	of	human	psychology	and cultures.	'Historicism'	meant	the	idea	that,	to	understand	any	phenomenon,	one	needs	to understand	its	history.	Obviously,	these	two	ideas	could	be	combined. Simmel	and	Mannheim	systematically	reflected	on	the	relationship	between	relativism and	historicism.	They	were	not	the	first	to	do	so.	Historical	and	philosophical	theorizing about	the	status	of	history	(as	a	field	of	study)	had	already	highlighted	the	tensions between	historical	contingency	and	philosophical	normativity.	The	novel	element	in	Simmel and	Mannheim	was	their	efforts	to	bring	these	issues	to	bear	on	the	philosophy	of	the social	sciences	in	general,	and	the	sociology	of	knowledge	in	particular. In	Simmel's	and	Mannheim's	work	relativism	and	historicism	featured	in	at	least	three different	ways.	First,	both	developed	and	defended	distinctive	general	claims	about	various kinds	of	"relativism".	Second,	in	their	historical	case	studies,	Simmel	and	Mannheim	made use	of,	what	they	regarded	as,	"relativistic"	methodologies.	And	third,	both	Mannheim made	the	emergence	of	relativism	and	historicism	a	central	topic	for	their	sociological- 1	Work	on	this	paper	was	made	possible	by	the	ERC	Advanced	Grant	Project	(2014-2019): 2 historical	inquiries.	Finally,	to	these	three	dimensions	of	relativism	within	Simmel's	and Mannheim's	writings,	we	can	add	a	fourth	that	goes	beyond:	their	writings	triggered vigorous	and	extensive	debates	about	relativism. My	overall	evaluative	thesis	is	that	my	early	sociologists	of	knowledge	were	not	fully successful	in	dealing	with	relativism.	Simmel	declared	himself	a	relativist	but	it	remains unclear	what	precisely	his	relativism	amounted	to.	Mannheim	had	a	clearer	view	of relativism	but	thought	of	it	as	something	the	sociology	of	knowledge	had	to	avoid	at	all costs.	But	he	hardly	succeeded	in	his	attempts	to	do	so.	Fortunately,	in	neither	case	did	the lack	of	success	regarding	the	philosophical	handling	of	relativism	weaken	the	quality	and interest	of	the	sociological-historical	case	studies. 2.	Simmel	on	Money	and	Philosophy A	natural	starting	point	for	my	investigation	is	Simmel's	Philosophie	des	Geldes (1900/2004).	I	am	here	only	considering	its	nascent	sociology	of	philosophy,	to	wit,	its attempts	to	identify	parallels	between	philosophical	ideas	and	economic	practices	or theorising.	Simmel	claims	that	such	type	of	inquiry	has	been	made	possible	by	the "worldview"	of	"relativism"	(142). The	central	contrast	running	through	the	book	is	between	modern	and ancient/medieval	interpretations	of	money.	The	ancient	or	medieval	rendering	amounted to	a	"materialist	conception"	(173):	the	value	of	money	is	the	"substance"	out	which	it	is made	(167).	Moreover,	influential	thinkers,	like	Aquinas,	insisted	that	money	should	not	be traded	or	lent	for	interest	(168).	Closely	related	to	this	was	the	"just	price	doctrine",	the idea	of	"a	direct	relationship	between	object	and	money-price"	(125).	As	Simmel	has	it,	the substance-value	conception	was	"the	appropriate	theoretical	expression	of	an	actual sociological	condition",	and	the	conception	fell	apart	when	the	condition	disappeared (173).	The	condition	in	question	was	that	people	in	ancient	and	medieval	times	valued "landed	property"	(234)	and	"an	agrarian	economy	...	with	few	and	hardly	variable intermediaries"	(235). This	rough	sketch	suffices	for	us	to	see	how	Simmel	links	the	"materialist	conception	of money"	to	philosophy.	He	proposes	that	this	conception	was	inseparable	from	–	that	is, both	supported	by	and	supportive	of	–	the	metaphysical	topoi	of	fixed	substances	with essential	or	accidental	properties;	a	static,	eternal	cosmos	(168);	a	static	social	organization (234);	and	forms	of	philosophy	focused	on	qualitative	rather	than	quantitative	categories (148). 3 Turning	from	Antiquity	and	the	Middle	Ages	to	Modernity,	Simmel	insists	that	the modern,	"transcendental",	understanding	of	money	radically	broke	with	its	predecessors.	It was	Adam	Smith	who	first	articulated	the	new	"transcendental	theory"	(173).	Most	human relationships	were	now	understood	as	relationships	of	exchange.	Indeed,	economic exchange	was	rendered	the	basic	building	block	of	society (99).	Exchange	was	taken	to	be "as	productive	and	value-creating	as	is	prodution	itself"	(81).	Simmel	emphasises	especially the	ways	in	which	the	market	mechanism	turns	numerous	different	subjective	preferences into	one	objective	value	(i.e.	the	stable	price)	(75-76). Simmel	finds	numerous	parallels	between	key	aspects	of	modern	monetary	reality	or economic	theorizing	and	philosophical	reflection.	Suffice	it	here	to	mention	three.	The	first concerns	"relativity":	the	economic	value	of	each	good	is	dependent	upon	–	and	thus relative	to	–	the	economic	value	of	every	other	good.	Money	"symbolizes"	such	relativity (118).	The	relativity	of	money	has	its	philosophical	analogue	in	the	emergence	of	various forms	of	relativism.	The	second	parallel	might	be	called	the	'dual	perspective	point':	on	the one	hand,	money	stands	aside	from,	or	opposite	to,	all	goods	that	can	be	bought	and	sold with	its	help.	But,	on	the	other	hand,	for	the	moderns,	money	is	also	itself	a	good	(119).	In the	philosophical	domain	this	corresponds	to	a	view	of	epistemic	norms	as	both constitutive	of	space	and	time,	and	as	empirical-psychological	phenomena	in	spatiotemporally	situated	subjects	(119),	and	a	view	of	the	ego	as	both	transcendental	and empirical	(128).	The	third	key	link	between	modern	money	and	philosophy	concerns "condensation".	For	the	modern	thinkers	money	"condenses"	the	value	of	things	(197).	The philosophical	counterparts	of	this	idea	vary:	they	include	the	notion	of	"laws	of	nature"	as condensations	of	"endless	particular	cases" (303);	the	modern	idea	of	the	"state"	that	– with	the	help	of	the	civil	service	–	functions	as	a	condensation	of	political	powers	(197);	and the	conception	of	"objectivity"	as	condensed	intersubjectivity	(79). 3.	Simmel	on	Historicism	and	Relativism Simmel	emphasizes	repeatedly	that	the	modern	understanding	of	money	goes	together with	philosophical	relativism	and	historicism.	This	naturally	invites	the	question	how Simmel	conceived	of	relativism	and	historicism.	Simmel	most	influential	intervention	into the	historicism	debates	–	the	Probleme	der	Geschichtsphilosophie	(1892/1989)	–	discussed the	"historical	apriori".2	This	is	the	idea	that	the	historian	invariably	imputes	mental	states 2	I	am	not	suggesting	that	Simmel	was	the	first	to	put	forward	this	idea,	but	he	developed	it	in exceptional	detail. 4 to	historical	actors,	and	that	the	selection	of	such	states	depends	crucially	on	the personality	and	social	background	of	the	historian	in	question	(304).	Accordingly,	Simmel rejects	Leopold	von	Ranke's	(1795-1886)	demand	according	to	which	historians	must "eliminate	themselves"	in	order	to	understand	the	past	(321).	Moreover,	Simmel	takes	his insight	as	confirmed	by	the	fact	that	there	is	space	for	a	sociological	study	of	historical scholarship:	it	is	usually	possible	to	identify	the	social	position	of	the	historians	from	their texts	(325).	In	some	places	Simmel	accepts	the	natural	implication	that	all	historical	work	is invariably	perspectival	(328). Simmel's	"historical	apriori"	resonated	with	many	other	authors	at	the	time.	One obvious	case	in	point	is	Theodor	Lessing's	(1872-1933)	Geschichte	als	Sinngebung	des Sinnlosen	(1921/2012).	The	title	sums	up	the	content	perfectly.	Ernst	Troeltsch's	(18651923)	Der	Historismus	und	seine	Probleme	(1922/1977)	attributes	to	Simmel	the	intention to	overcome	"suffocating	'historical	realism'"	(578).	But	Troeltsch	is	not	satisfied	with Simmel's	reflections:	"To	Dilthey's	relativism	of	values	he	[i.e.	Simmel]	adds	a	shaky relativism	concerning	the	relationship	between	the	reality	of	experience	and	the construction	of	historical	knowledge.	Historicism	is	overcome	by	means	of	its	radical	...	selfapplication;	but	really,	it	falls	into	a	void,	and	nobody	gains	anything"	(582). Not	everyone	agreed	with	Troeltsch.	Using	Simmel's	historical	apriori	as	a	premise, Max	Scheler	(1874-1928)	influentially	declared	historicism	self-undermining	(1926/1960: 135-158).	The	historicist	claims	the	historical	record	to	show	that	epistemic	and	moral standards	vary	between	cultures	and	epochs.	In so	doing, the	historicist	"naïvely"	assumes there	to	be	"historical	facts".	This	is	naïve	since	historicist	reflection	itself	maintains	that historical	facts	are	"relative	to	the	present".	Historicism	has	thereby	robbed	itself	of	the data	which	could	provide	it	with	empirical	support.	Historicism	refutes	itself. What	did	Simmel	himself	think	of	relativism	and	historicsm	as	philosophical	positions? How	did	he	interpret	the	historical	apriori?	Did	he	agree	with	Troeltsch	that	his	position	was a	radical	relativism? To	begin	with	the	historical	apriori,	Simmel	did	not	hold	that	all	perspectives	are equally	good.	For	instance,	while	he	is	adament	that	some	aspects	of	historical	actors' experiences	might	never	be	understood,	he	does	not	draw	the	relativistic	conclusion	that therefore	historical	sources	are	infinitely	plyable	(1892/1989:	326).	He	adds	that	when historians	investigate	the	experiences	of	past	groups	–	rather	than	past	individuals	–	their chances	of	getting	at	the	original	sentiments	are	high.	This	is	because	groups	have	"general, big	and	coarse	interests"	(331)	that	do	not	much	change	over	time.	Simmel	also	leaves room	for	the	historian	"genius"	who	is	able	to	grasp	past	experiences	to	a	higher	degree 5 than	anyone	else.	The	genius	does	so	on	the	basis	of	"innate	memories	of	the	species" (328).	Moreover,	Simmel	writes	that	"we	are	able	to	reconstruct	the	psychological processes	of	others	and	with	a	strong	feeling	of	being	totally	correct	..."	(328);	or	that "there	is	enough	evidence"	for	the	"monistic	belief"	that	thought	is	largely	"uniform	and simple"	(337).	Simmel	is	somewhat	less	optimistic	when	it	comes	to	historical	laws	or philosophies	of	history.	Here	there	is	little	chance	to	overcome	or	adjudicate	competing proposals.	Simmel	weakens	the	relativism	of	these	claims,	however,	by	declaring	historical laws	and	philosophies	of	history	to	be	of	merely	heuristic	value	(421):	as	guides	for	research they	do	not	postulate	conflicting	truths. As	far	as	relativism	in	the	Philosophie	des	Geldes	is	at	issue,	we	need	to	attend primarily	to	the	"relativity"	point:	the	modern	understanding	of	money	corresponds	to	a diverse	set	of	philosophical "relativisms".	To	begin	with	epistemic	justification,	Simmel holds	that	it	is	relative	to	epistemic	principles.	And	since	these	principles	need	to	be justified	in	turn,	we	end	up	in	an	infinite	or	circular	chain.	Simmel	actually	insists	that	the chain	is	both	infinite	and	circular	at	the	same	time.	It	is	infinite	insofar	as	we	are	unable	to reach	absolute	principles	as	ultimate	stopping	points.	It	is	circular	insofar	as	our	justifying activity	is	never	able	to	step	beyond	the	circle	of	beliefs	(1900/2004:	101-103).3	Somewhat abruptly	Simmel	adds	an	evolutionary	epistemology	according	to	which	a	representation	is justified	if,	and	only	if,	it	has	been	produced	by	a	psychological	mechanism	which	adds	to the	fitness	of	the	species.	None	of	the	"worldviews"	of	different	species	"copy"	the	external world	"in	its	objectivity".	They	all	have	their	own	truth	(ibid.:	104). Simmel's	ontological	relativism	relates	to	the	distinction	between	Medieval	and Modern	ways	of	thinking:	the	ontology	of	substances	has	given	way	to	an	ontology	of (quantitative)	relations.	There	is	no	fact	of	the	matter	as	to	which	ontology	is	absolutely correct.	Still,	the	thought	of	"the	general	relativity	of	the	world"	is	the	natural	"adjustment on	the	part	of	our	intellect"	to	contemporary	"social	and	subjective	life	in	which	money	has found	its	real	effective	embodiment	and	the	reflected	symbol	of	its	forms	and	movements" (ibid.:	518).	This	line	of	reasoning	makes	Simmel	a	historicist	relativist	about	the	conflict between	(ontological)	absolutism	and	relativism. Finally	there	is	philosophical	"relativism"	concerning	opposites	like	"pluralism"	and "monism",	"realism"	and	"idealism",	"subjectivism"	and	"objectivism":	Simmel	treats	them all	as	"heuristic	principles".	"Objective	truth"	results	from	the	interplay	of	many	different such	principles	(ibid.:	112). 3	Simmel	took	these	distinctions	from	Spencer	(1867). 6 Was	all	this	relativism	by	the	standards	of	the	time?	Here	one	key	litmus	test	was	–	as the	Neokantians	or	Phenomenologists	were	urging	–	whether	the	given	theory	conflated "Genese	und	Geltung"	(causal	origin	and	validity).	Simmel	declared	himself	"not	guilty".	He emphasizes	that	the	Law	of	Gravity	"belongs	within	the	category	of	the	valid	and meaningful	that	is	not	open	to	further	[psychological	or	sociological]	analysis"	(1892/1989: 105).	And	elsewhere	he	sharply	distinguishes	between	"positive	ethics"	(i.e.	the	sociology and	psychology	of	ethics)	and	"prescriptive	ethics"	(1892-93/1989:	10-11).	Max	Adler (1919:	10)	reports	that	"usually	by	relativism	one	means	a	state	of	mind	which	denies	the possibility	of	universally	valid	claims	and	which	reduces	the	validity	of	our	judgments ultimately	to	their	practical	usefulness	..."	Adler	insists	that	"nothing	of	all	this	fits	Simmel's intellectual	dispositions".	Max	Frischeisen-Köhler	(1920)	also	suggests	that	"relativism" cannot	be	used	to	characterize	Simmel's	position.	His	reason	is	that	relativism	has	become "too	general	and	vague"	a	term	for	it	to	be	useful	as	a	characterization	of	any	philosopher. Still,	judged	by	Edmund	Husserl's	(1859-1938)	attack	on	"psychologism",	every	form	of evolutionary	epistemology	is	"psychologistic"	(i.e.	species	relativism)	(1900/1970:	§36). Thus	by	Husserl's	criteria	Simmel's	evolutionary	epistemology	is	relativistic. Are	Simmel's	relativisms	relativistic	by	our	standards	today?	It	seems	right	to	say	that by	most	standards	Simmel	would	at	least	qualify	as	an	ontological	relativist.	Which ontological	theory	we	accept	depends	on	the	culture	we	live	in,	and	there	is	no	higher	court of	appeal.	As	far	as	epistemic	relativism	is	concerned,	the	issue	is	difficult	to	decide. Simmel's	insistence	on	infinite	chains	of	justification,	or	his	evolutionary	speculations	would not	be	counted	as	obviously	relativistic	by	most	of	today's	epistemologists.	His	references to	the	circle	of	beliefs	sound	like	a	form	of	coherence	theory.	And	it	is	an	open	debate whether	and	to	what	extent	the	coherence	theory	of	epistemic	justification	has	relativistic leanings	(Steizinger	2015). Summa	summarum:	It	is	hard	to	capture	Simmel's	enthusiastic	search	for	ever	new forms	of	relativism	in	today's	categories	and	classifications.	While	one	can	recognize	certain familiar	relativistic	motifs,	the	overall	position	remains	elusive. 4.	Mannheim	on	Conservatism Turning	from	Simmel	to	Mannheim,	the	first	central	text	for	my	concerns	is	his Habilitationschrift	"Altkonservatismus"	(1925/1986).	This	is	a	study	of	four	legal philosophers	and	jurists	in	the	early	eighteenth	century:	Justus	Möser	(1720-1794),	Adam Heinrich	Müller	(1779-1829),	Gustav	von	Hugo	(1764-1844),	and	Friedrich	Carl	von	Savigny 7 (1779-1861).	As	Mannheim	explains,	they	formulated	conservatism	as	a	new	"thoughtstyle",	opposed	to	the	"bourgeois-revolutionary	style,	the	natural-law	mode	of	thinking" (102).	A	thought-style	is	motivated	by	social-political	interests	and	"constitutes	a	world"	by means	of	its	own	specific	vocabulary	(51,	56).	Conservatism	can,	but	need	not,	combine with	romanticism.	Romanticism	arises	in	opposition	to	a	"thorough-going	rationalisation	of the	world".	It	is	motived	by	the	"displaced"	and	"irrational"	(59,	65,	66).	Political conservatism	is	an	"objective",	"historical-dynamic	structural	complex"	(75).	It	presupposes a	"society	differentiated	into	classes"	(86). One	of	Mannheim's	central	aims	is	to	develop	a	"morphology	of	conservative thought",	and	to	identify	its	"inner	formative	principle"	(87).	By	Mannheim's	reckoning	this principle	is	the	clinging	to	the	concrete.	For	instance,	property	(in	Möser)	is	a	"definite, vital,	and	reciprocal	relationship	between	the	owner	and	the	thing	owned"	(89).	Freedom must	be	concrete	not	abstract;	it	must	be	tied	to	our	"individual	laws".	Ranke	later	insisted that	freedom	must	tied	to	estates	or	the	state	(93). Mannheim	holds	that	the	conservative	thought-style	can	only	be	understood	as	the negation	of	the	earlier	"natural-law	thought-style".	The	latter	was	understood	by conservatives	as	having	the	following	ingredients	(106-107): (A) Doctrines	of	... (B) Thinking the	state	of	nature rationalism the	social	contract eduction	from	principles popular	sovereignty universal	principles Rights	of	Man universal	applicability	of	all	laws atomism	and	mechanism static	thinking The	conservative	response	took	the	form	of	insisting	that	social	organisms	are	unique; this	precluded	universal	principles	or	universal	laws	(108).	It	also	favoured	totalities (cultures,	traditions)	over	individuals.	And	against	"reason"	it	stressed	the	importance	of "history,	life,	nation"	(107),	and	celebrated	the	"irrationality	of	reality"	(108).	To	be	precise, it	was	only	the	first	generation	of	conservatives	that	attacked	reason	outright.	Later generations	–	esp.	Hegel	–	aimed	to	fuse	history	and	rationality	by	developing	dynamic conceptions	of	reason	(109). 8 Abstract	morphology	to	one	side,	Mannheim	also	seeks	to	illuminate	the	actual historical	development.	The	"first	conservative	position"	(in	Möser)	was	a	reaction	of	the Prussian	nobility	and	its	middle-class	"ideologues"	against	"bureaucratic-absolutist rationalism"	(112-114).	The	ideologues	were	"socially	unattached	intellectuals"	who	"hired out	their	pens";	they	were	"archetypal	apologists".	(116-119).	Importantly,	(philosophy	of) history	now	became	a	key	focus.	For	Mannheim	this	is	"the	positive	element"	(118)	in conservatism.	Möser	emphasized	old	customs	and	habits;	every	town	should	have	its	own laws	(134).	Historicism	emerged	once	the	interest	in	history	became	pronounced. "Historicism	is	...	of	conservative	origin,"	Mannheim	wrote.	He	explaines	that	we	reach historicism	"when	the	process	whereby	things	have	come	about	is	itself	experienced	with feeling"	(127).	In	this	context	Mannheim	applauds	"...	the	fruitful	relativism	flowing	out	of historicism	...	which	renders	even	the	observer	relative	to	the	process	of	becoming	which moves	over	and	through	him"	(126).	Mannheim	adds:	"This	form	of	thinking	...	has	in	effect become	a	historical	a	priori	for	us"	(143). Müller	is	the	central	figure	in	the	second	stage	the	development.	He	began	to	combine conservatism	with	romanticism.	Romanticism	means	an	emphasis	on	life	and	its	diversity. For	Mannheim	this	move	anticipated	"Lebensphilosophie"	(136-138).	Müller	was	generally sceptical	about	conceptual	thought.	No	concept	was	able	to	capture	the	dynamic	nature	of social	realities	(141).	Müller	aimed	to	make	thinking	similar	to	life:	this	meant	an	extensive use	of	analogy	and	conceiving	of	the	world	as	unfolding	according	to	diametrically	opposed principles	(143). The	third	phase	brought	a	consolidation	of	the	conservative	thought-style.	This	was the	time	of	the	"Historical	School"	and	von	Savigny.	The	latter	never	tired	of	attacking	the idea	of	general	(Napoleonic)	legal	codes:	"the	real	seat	of	law	is	the	common	consciousness of	the	people"	(156).	As	a	romantic	conservative	von	Savigny	discovered	irrationality everywhere,	including	in	the	individual	and	in	the	application	of	laws	(166-167).	Mannheim deems	von	Savigny	important	as	a	forerunner	of	the	humanities	of	his	(i.e.	Mannheim's) time:	von	Savigny	developed	the	method	of	"elucidation"	(studying	phenomena	in	and through	their	historical	becoming)	that	informed	all	later	work	in	the	humanities	(184). A	second	important	figure	in	the	third	stage	of	the	development	was	von	Hugo.	He took	"...	a	preliminary	step	towards	the	fruitful	relativism	of	historicism"	by	developing	a "unique	relativism"	tied	to	"disillusioned	conservatism"	(176).	Von	Hugo	undermined natural	law	by	measuring	it	against	the	plurality	of	positive	law;	but	he	also	criticized positive	law	in	light	of	natural	law.	Neither	perspectives	was	ultimately	privileged.	von	Hugo strikes	Mannheim	as	a	forerunner	of	Max	Weber	(176). 9 5.	Mannheim	on	Historicism	and	Relativism Historicism	and	relativism	surface	at	many	points	in	the	Habilitationsschrift,	and	it	is	useful to	pull	together	the	main	themes	and	influences.	First,	historicism,	relativism,	and elucidation	are	said	to	be	"positive	elements", a	valuable	legacy,	of	political	conservatism; a	"historical	a	priori	for	us".	Second,	from	Oswald	Spengler's	(1880-1936)	Untergang	des Abendlandes	(1918/1991),	Mannheim	adopts	the	idea	of	a	"morphology"	of	"thoughtstyles",	and	of	"formative	principles"	that	"constitute"	their	respective	"worlds"	and incommensurable	languages.	Third,	Altkonservatismus	endorses	Simmel's	conception	of	the historical	apriori:	Enlightenment	and	conservative	writing	of	history	are	said	to	have	been differrent;	and	at	least	by	implication	historical	worlds	must	be	worlds-for-differentthought-styles.	Finally,	fourth,	Mannheim	does	not	allow	for	a	neutral	viewpoint.	The	fact that	intellectuals	were	"socially	unattached"	did	not	enable	them	to	achieve	such neutrality;	instead	they	were	forced	to	"hire	out	their	pens". In	the	paper	"Historismus"	(1924/1964)	–	written	just	one	year	before	the Habilitationsschrift	was	presented	in	Heidelberg,	Mannheim	draws	a	somewhat	different picture	of	historicism	and	relativism.	One	central	motif	is	the	distinction	between	three different	fields	of	knowledge	and	their	respective	histories	(294).	These	fields	differ	in	the extent	to	which	they	are	affected	by	historicism. (i) "Civilisation":	this	is	the	realm	of	the	natural	sciences	and	mathematics,	of	"static truths"	and	progress	(282).	In	this	arena,	and	only	here,	the	rationalist	epistemologies	of Neokantianism	and	Phenomenology	have	traction.	These	sciences	are	not	affected	by historicism. (ii)	"Dialectic	Rationality":	This	is	the	domain	of	philosophy	to	which	historicism applies.	Here	truth	is	"dynamic",	and	can	only	be	captured	by	Hegelian	dialectic.	At	best, philosophical	systems	"express	the	truth	of	their	respective	epochs"	(287).	But	Mannheim also	speaks	of	"dialectical	truth"	as	the	truth	concerning	the	dynamics	and	telos	of	history (289). (iii)	"Soul-culture":	This	is	where	the	historical-cultural	sciences	belong.	They	are committed	to	the	idea	that	"every	epoch	must	be	interpreted	through	its	very	own	soulcentre"	(292).	This	is	in	line	with	historicism	or	relativism.	But	still,	Mannheim	deems	it possible	to	offer	a	criterion	of	truth	for	this	arena,	too:	it	is	to	grasp	the	object	"adequately in	its	full	depth"	(293). 10 A	second	central	motif	of	the	1924	paper	relates	to	the	"historical	apriori".	Why	do	we assume	that	our	perspectives	are	able	to	adequately	capture	the	"historical	Dinge-an-sich"? Mannheim	thinks	that	"Troeltsch	found	the	right	starting	point"	for	an	answer	(276). Mannheim	is	referring	here	to	Troeltsch's	cryptic	remark	that	"thought	must	...	have	a secret	link	to	reality"	(Troeltsch	1922/1977:	183):	historians'	perspectives	are	often adequate	to	their	subject	matter	since	both	the	perspectives	and	the	subject	matter	are products	of	one	and	the	same	historical	process.	Mannheim	expresses	the	thought	also	in idealist	garb:	"...	principally	the	absolute	...	can	be	grasped	only	...	in	categories	that	are shaped	by	[its	own]	process	of	becoming";	"history	gives	us	concrete-contentful	standards; ...	we	are	able	to	identify	them	only	because	we	already	have	them	instinctively,	insofar	as we	are	carried	by	the	total	spirit	..."	(1924/1964:	303-305) For	Mannheim	the	two	central	motifs	–	the	distinction	between	(i),	(ii),	(iii)	and	the development	of	the	absolute	spirit	–	are	connected.	The	absolute	spirit	has	been	invested in	the	three	forms	of	knowledge	to	different	degrees	in	different	epochs.	Mannheim	also suggests	that	different	social	classes	are	preferentially	drawn	to	one	of	the	realms.	But	no class	carries	the	"total	movement"	(296).	Although	Mannheim	admits	that	his	own philosophy	is	also	"tied	to	a	standpoint",	he	still	deems	himself	capable	of	predicting	the next	step,	beyond	(iii).	This	next	step	is	the	challenge	to	find	a	perspective	from	which	the tripartite	distinction	of	fields	of	knowledge	(i)	to	(iii)	can	be	overcome. This	"pluralist"	(304)	theoretical	edifice,	Mannheim	believes,	can	be	used	to	block	the charge	of	relativism.	Different	perspectives	can	reach	partial	truths	-	insofar	as	the absolute	grants	these.	Different	truths	of	different	historical	periods	are	not	different interpretations	of	the	same,	but	interpretations	of	different	stages	of	the	absolute	or	spirit. This	is	not	to	say	that	perspectives	cannot	be	criticized.	But	the	main	criticism	that	can	be directed	at	them	is	that	they	overgeneralize:	they	claim	to	apply	to	a	much	wider	range	of phenomena	than	they	actually	do	(253). In	Mannheim's	Ideologie	und	Utopie	(1931/1936)	we	get	yet	a	third	response	to historicism	and	relativism.	Mannheim	now	seeks	to	adapt	Marxist	vocabularies	and	motifs, especially	elements	of	Georg	Lukacs'	Geschichte	and	Klassenbewusstsein	(1923/2000). "Thought-styles"	are	replaced	with	"ideologies"	qua	holistic	systems	of	meaning	and	beliefs (1931/1936:	74).	Mannheim	now	also	puts	a	much	greater	emphasis	on	the "Seinsgebundenheit"	of	thought.	That	is,	the	knowledge	of	politics,	the	humanities	and	the social	sciences	are	all	tied	to	material	conditions	(243-44).	But	Mannheim	is	convinced	that the	thesis	of	the	Seinsgebundenheit	of	knowledge	does	not	commit	him	to	relativism. Mannheim	prefers	to	call	his	view	"relationism":	"all	historical	knowledge	is	relational 11 knowledge".	In	other	words,	different	bodies	of	knowledge	are	always	tied	to	different webs	of	meaning	and	beliefs,	and	to	specific	historical	situations.	This	is	why	a	strict	division between	Genese	and	Geltung	cannot	be	upheld	(76).	Of	course,	by	the	Neokantian standards,	denying	such	strict	division	was	precisely	what	qualified	Mannheim's	position	as relativist. Nevertheless,	there	is	a	criterion	for	assessing	ideologies	or	theories,	Mannheim claims.	A	given	ideology	or	theory	is	correct	if	it	does	not	"prevent	man	from	adjusting himself	at	the	given	historical	stage"	(85).	Finally,	Mannheim	needs	an	epistemic	subject	for identifying	the	specific	Seinsgebundenheit	of	specific	ideologies	and	for	creating "syntheses"	out	of	them.	He	resurrects	a	key	figure	from	his	Altkonservatismus	study	(and Weber	[1923]):	the	"socially	unattached	(freischwebende)	intelligentsia".	Its	epistemic privilege	rests	on	its	ability	to	replace	class-ties	with	"Bildung"	ties	(1931/1936:	138). Turning	from	Mannheim's	views	to	their	reception,	in	the	late	1920s	and	early	1930s Mannheim's	views	triggered	what	in	retrospect	we	might	call	the	"Sociologism	Wars".	Since I	have	analysed	these	debates	at	greater	length	elsewhere	(Kusch	1999),	and	since	I	return to	them	below,	suffice	it	to	say	that	Mannheim's	position	was	attacked	from	every	end	of the	political	spectrum.	Key	points	of	contention	were	the	restriction	of	Seinsgebundenheit to	the	social	sciences	and	the	humanities	(Sombart);	an	excessive	or	insufficient	proximity to	Marx	(A.	Weber,	Neurath);	the	inflationary	use	of	"ideology"	(Jonas,	Stern,	Tillich);	the Hegelianism	of	the	Historismus	paper	(Horkheimer);	and	–	of	course	–	Mannheim's	alleged relativism	(Grünwald).	(Kusch	1999) Which	naturally	brings	us	to	the	question	whether	Mannheim	is	a	relativist	by	today's standards.	This	is	best	answered	separately	for	the	three	key	texts.	It	is	hard	to	see	how	one could	read	the	Altkonservatismus	study	as	anything	but	a	relativistic	investigation.	The extensive	use	of	Spenglerian	categories	and	ideas	commits	Mannheim	to	a	form	of	cultural relativism	based	on	incommensurable	thought-styles.	The	account	of	the	Historismus	paper avoids	relativism,	but	at	the	high	price	of	a	Hegelian	metaphysics.	Finally,	the	position	of Ideologie	und	Utopie	escapes	the	relativism-charge	only	by	relying	on	the	assumption	of	the "free-floating	intelligentsia". 6.	Interpretation	and	Evaluations I	now	turn	to	some	evaluative	comments,	using	existing	criticism	as	my	starting	points.	I begin	with	problems	in	Simmel's	case	study	of	money	and	philosophy. 12 The	first	issue	to	be	assessed	is	Simmel's	relativistic	methodology.	Contemporary critics	found	it	unconvincing.	For	Emile	Durkheim	(1858-1917)	Simmel	is	wrong	to	isolate various	forms	and	conceptions	of	money	from	the	institutions	that	make	them	possible (1902/1980:	98).	Durkheim	also	condemns	Simmel's	"bastard	speculation"	as	a	mixture	of scientific	observation	and	artistic	intuition"	(ibid.).	Max	Weber	(1864-1920),	both	in	his	Die protestantische	Ethik	und	der	Geist	des	Kapitalismus	(1904-5/1976)	and	in	a	1908manuscript	(1908/1970),	is	also	critical.	In	the	book	he	rejects	the	way	in	which	Simmel detaches	modern	money	from	the	capitalist	mode	of	production	(1904-5/1976:	193,	185). In	the	manuscript	Weber	reports	that	the	money-book	triggers	"out-right	explosions	of rage"	amongst	economists	(1908/1970:	161).	Weber	sees	the	main	culprit	in	Simmel's undisciplined	use	of	analogy	(ibid.:	160).	It	is	hard	to	disagree. Perhaps	there	is	a	way,	however,	to	redeem	Simmel's	Philosophie	des	Geldes. Remember	that	Simmel	took	the	book	to	be	a	contribution	to	the	philosophy	of	history	and that	for	him	philosophies	of	history	are	not	strictly	true	or	false.	Their	value	is	to	be measured	by	how	useful	they	are	as	heuristic	tools,	that	is,	as	temporary	signposts	for empirical	work,	and	as	ultimately	and	ideally	fully	superseded	by	the	latter.	Taken	in	that sense,	we	might	think	of	Simmel	as	urging	sociologists	to	determine	the	ways	in	which economic	theorizing	and	financial	practices	have	influenced	philosophical	thought.	Treating Simmel's	book	in	this	way	is	to	treat	it	the	way	we	nowadays	think	of	other	such	sweeping theses,	for	instance,	the	"Sombart	Thesis"	(Sombart	1902)	according	to	which	double	bookkeeping	brought	about	the	Scientific	Revolution;	the	"Weber	Thesis"	(Weber	1904-5)	on	the interaction	between	Protestantism	and	capitalism;	or	the	"Merton	Thesis"	(Merton	1938) on	Pietism	and	early	experimental	science.	These	sweeping	theses	are	overgeneralizations and	false	as	such.	But	they	are	highly	suggestive	of	more	restricted	and	local	case	studies (e.g.	on	the	influence	of	game-theory	in	political	philosophy). As	far	as	Simmel's	more	general	comments	on	relativism	and	historicism	are concerned,	the	early	responses	were	either	highly	critical	or	excessively	charitable.	I	have already	quoted	Troeltsch's	dismissive	assessment	above	(1922/1977:	582).	More sympathetic	commentators	like	Adler	(1919)	or	Frischeisen-Köhler	(1920)	confirm	that Troeltsch's	assessment	was	typical	of	the	times.	Curiously,	Adler	and	Frischeisen-Köhler then	go	on	to	defend	Simmel	against	the	charge	of	relativism	by	rendering	the	doctrine	in ways	Simmel	himself	would	have	rejected:	Simmel	does	not	(like	Frischeisen-Köhler)	take relativism	to	be	undefinable;	and	he	does	not	(like	Adler)	conceive	of	relativism	as	a reduction	of	truth	to	utility. 13 The	debate	over	Simmel's	relativism	has	not	ended	in	the	1920s.	Raymond	Bourdon (1989)	suggests	that	Simmel	is	a	anti-skeptical	"neokantian	relativist"	seeking	to	identify "variable	apriori	assumptions"	(1989:	415).	Bourdon's	interpretation	belongs	to	a	French tradition	of	reading	Simmel	that	Gregor	Fitzi	(2002)	traces	back	to	the	early	twentieth century.	On	this	interpretation	Simmel's	relativism	is	a	"transcendental	philosophy	aware	of its	limits	in	both	epistemology	and	ethics"	(2002:	247).	One	need	not	disagree	with	this suggestion	to	feel	that	it	gets	at	only	some	aspects	of	Simmel's	overall	relativist	aspirations. For	instance,	it	has	nothing	to	say	about	Simmel's	ontological	relativism. Commentators	from	the	realm	of	cultural	studies	have	highlighted	other	aspects	of Simmel's	position.	Deena	and	Michael	A.	Weinstein	celebrate	Simmel's	"historicism"	or "postmodern	form	of	historizing"	as	"a	kind	of	radical	pragmatism	...	History	is	the	freedom of	the	historian	to	historize	according	to	any	interest	in	the	past	...	so	long	as	the	control	of fact	is	respected"	(1993:	183).	Elizabeth	S.	Goodstein	(2017:	86,	160)	holds	that	"Simmel deployed	epistemic	relativism	...	as	a	means	of	overcoming	what	appear	to	be	aporetic dualisms-between	materialism	and	idealism,	determination	and	freedom,	life	and	form	..." Goldstein	believes	that	even	the	opposition	between	relativism	and	absolutism	is	overcome where	Simmel's	"relativized	relativism"	historicizes	both.	Goodstein's	remark	is	indeed	a helpful	observation. Finally,	Klaus	Christian	Köhnke	(1995:	480)	and	Wilfried	Gessner	(2003:	92-3)	suggest that	Simmel's	relativism	is	really	a	form	of	Mannheimian	"relationism".	The	reason, according	to	Gessner,	is	that	Simmel's	intentions	are	antiskeptical	and	aiming	to	"combine the	objectivity	of	validity	with	the	relativity	of	origin".	Unfortunately,	neither	author	then goes	on	to	defend	the	coherence	and	plausibility	of	Mannheim's	relationism. As	I	already	indicated	in	the	last	section,	Mannheim's	attempt	to	steer	a	path	between relativism	and	absolutism	did	not	meet	with	much	enthusiasm	in	the	1920s.	Max Horkheimer	insisted	that	Mannheim	should	have	followed	Marx	on	this	point.	Whereas Marx	had	taken	the	view	that	all	knowledge	was	relative	to	class, Mannheim	was	trying	to re-introduce	an	absolutistic	perspective. For	Mannheim	all	particular	viewpoints	ultimately seemed	to	fit	together	into	one	big	absolute	viewpoint	(Horkheimer	1929/1982:	486). Ernst	Grünwald	chose	a	different	line	of	attack.	Grünwald	accused	Mannheim's sociology	of	knowledge	of	being	both	"absurd"	and	"false".	The	charge	of	absurdity	is justified	as	follows:	"'Relationism'	claims	that	all	thinking	is	valid	only	relative	to	a standpoint;	but	for	this	very	sentence,	that	is,	that	all	thinking	is	valid	only	relatively, relationism	demands	absolute	validity"	(1934/1982:	750). But	Mannheim's	'sociologism'	is also	based	on	the	altogether	false	assumption	that	thinking	in	general,	and	judgements	in 14 particular	are	seinsgebunden. According	to	Grünwald	this	has	to	be	false:	since	judgements can	be	studied	from	many	different	viewpoints-e.g.	those	of	sociology	or	psychology- judgements	in	themselves	cannot	be	reduced	to	any	of	these	viewpoints	(1934/1982:	707). Finally,	Grünwald	argues	that	the	sociology	of	knowledge	could	never	replace	epistemology and	that	research	in	the	sociology	of	knowledge	would	always	have	to	presuppose	prior epistemological	research. Epistemology	studies	the	validity	claims	of	judgements,	and these	validity	claims	are	independent	of,	and	prior	to,	external	factors	like	social	interests (1934/1982:	701-707).	–	Mannheim	did	not	have	the	argumentative	resources	needed	to rebut	these	attacks. There	are	also	important	and	weighty	objections	to	Mannheim's	Altkonservatismus study.	It	is	easy,	for	example,	to	agree	with	Rodney	Nelson	(1992)	that	there	is	"a	relative paucity	of	social-historical	analysis	in	Conservatism;	[and	that]	a	demographic	portrait	of the	German	aristocracy	in	the	early	nineteenth	century	and	a	rigorous	documentation	of shifts	in	their	socioeconomic	status	would	have	added	greatly	to	the	analysis"	(1992:	43). Relatedly,	Nelson	also	laments	the	"static	essentialism	of	thought-styles"	and	the	idea	that "cultural	products	actually	contain	entelechies;	that	the	development	of	a	style	of	thought is	in	some	indeterminable	sense	prefigured	in	its	origin"	(1992:	45).	Other	critics	have attacked	the	tautology	in	Mannheim's	imputation	of	thought-styles	to	groups:	Mannheim defines	groups	in	terms	of	thought-styles,	and	thought-styles	in	terms	of	groups	(Carlsnaess 1981).	On	a	more	general	level,	later-day	sociologists	of	knowledge	have	lamented Mannheim's	excluding	of	mathematics	and	the	natural	sciences	from	the	subject	matter	of their	discipline	(Bloor	1973;	cf.	Seidel	2011). And	yet,	all	these	important	criticisms	do	not	invalidate	the	attempt	to	define	political conservatism;	and	Mannheim's	definition	remains	influential	even	today.	Moreover,	the essential	core	of	Mannheim's	sociohistorical	study	of	philosophical	knowledge	can	easily	be formulated	without	any	"morphology	of	thought-styles."	As	an	exercise	in	the	sociology	of philosophy	–	showing	how	historicism	and	relativism first	emerge	in	political conservatism – Mannheim's	Conservatism	remains	a	model	and	inspiration. Turning	to	the	broader	issue	of	how	to	think	about	historicism	and	relativism	I	want	to underline	for	a	last	time	the	interesting	historical	reflexivity	in	both	account.	Both	Simmel and	Mannheim	seek	to	understand	the	historical	conditions	of	the	possibility	of	their	own analyses	–	and	this	for	both	historicism	and	relativism.	This	type	of	historical	reflexivity	is	a rare	commodity	in	contemporary	sociology	of	philosophical	(or	scientific)	knowledge. Moreover,	Simmel's	contribution	to	historicism	is	still	thought-provoking	and	wellworth	reflecting	on.	That	historical	facts	are	not	simply	given	is	now	widely	taken	for 15 granted;	and	today	we	have	of	course	authors	like	Hayden	White	(1973)	and	Ian	Hacking (1995)	who	put	forward	more	radical	historiographical	claims.	Of	course	philosophers	today do	not	believe	that	historical	reflexivity	invariably	leads	into	an	abyss	–	like	Troeltsch	did; nor	that	it	can	justify	universal	values	–	like	Scheler	did.	But	we	still	struggle	with	explaining how	historical	reflexivity	and	historical	realism	are	to	be	reconciled.	In	that	sense	Simmel's challenge	is	still	pressing	today. Finally,	as	far	as	Simmel's	celebration	of	relativism	is	concerned,	it	is	a	bit	unfortunate that	he	runs	together	so	many	different	ideas	together	under	this	one	title.	Many	of	the things	Simmel	called	"relativism"	are	today	flourishing	research	projects	in	their	own	right (evolutionary	epistemology,	pluralism,	coherence	theories,	infinitism,	etc.). Turning	from	Simmel	to	Mannheim,	the	latter's	contortions	to	escape	the	charge	of relativism	are	hardly	convincing	since	in	each	of	his	programmes	the	intellectual	costs	are too	high.	Spenglerism	with	its	ingredients	of	incommensurability,	skepticism	and	organicism is	not	an	attractive	option.	The	Hegelianism	of	the	Historismus	paper	avoids	epistemic relativism	only	at	the	cost	of	ontological	relativism	(the	absolute	presents	different	periods with	different	realities).	Concerning	the	free-floating	intelligentsia,	it	is	puzzling	how Mannheim	by	1931	could	suddenly	convince	himself	that	it	is	able,	after	all,	to	escape	"the fate"	so	vividly	described	in	Altkonservatismus. 7.	Summary	and	Conclusions I	have	tried	to	show	Simmel's	and	Mannheim's	deep	and	extensive	preoccupations	with relativistic	and	historicist	themes.	Both	philosopher-sociologists	thought	of	relativism	and historicism	as	important	elements	of	their	methodology	for	the	sociology	of	philosophy; both	tried	to	understand	the	emergence	of	relativism	and	historicism	historically;	and	both reflected	systematically	on	which	forms	of	relativism	might	be	defensible.	Many	of	their central	questions	and	concerns	have	stood	the	test	of	time. There	are	also	of	course	important	differences	between	Simmel	and	Mannheim.	On the	one	hand,	as	we	move	historically	forward,	from	Simmel	to	Mannheim,	the	sociology	of knowledge	sheds	a	commitment	to	broad-brush	and	speculative	philosophy	of	history,	at least	as	far	as	the	case-studies	are	concerned.	This	is	progress.	On	the	other	hand,	the	early SImmel's	theorizing	concerning	historicism	seems	more	sober,	more	twenty-first-century than	Mannheim's	frequent	relapses	into	Spenglerism	or	Hegelianism	(at	least	in	his programmatic	texts).	At	the	same	time,	in	his	theoretical	writings	Mannheim	challenges	us 16 to	investigate	how	epistemology	must	change	to	do	justice	to	the	results	of	the	sociology	of knowledge.	To	me	the	question	is	still	relevant. Where	does	all	of	this	leave	us	concerning	the	issue	of	relativism,	especially	relativism in	the	context	of	the	sociology	of	knowledge?	The	question	is	worth	asking	in	this	general form,	since	clearly	the	issue	is	as	topical	today	as	it	was	a	hundred	years	ago	(cf.	Schantz and	Seidel	2011).	Obviously,	we	cannot	simply	adopt	'the	right	answer'	from	Simmel	and Mannheim;	as	we	have	seen,	their	proposals	are	beset	by	many	problems.	But	perhaps	the real	lesson	is	in	any	case	an	indirect	one:	perhaps	the	connection	between	a	philosophically worked-out	commitment	to	relativism	on	the	one	hand,	and	historical	case	studies	in	the sociology	of	knowledge	on	the	other	hand	is	not	as	tight	as	is	often	assumed	by	cardcarrying	sociological	relativists.	Simmel	declared	himself	a	relativist	but	it	remained	unclear what	precisely	his	relativism	amounted	to.	And	yet	he	gave	us	a	highly	suggestive	and thought-provoking	investigation	into	the	influence	of	(theorizing	about)	money	on	our modern	worldview.	Mannheim	had	a	clearer	view	of	what	relativism	was	but	thought	of	it as	something	the	sociology	of	knowledge	had	to	avoid	at	all	costs.	His	attempts	to	do	so failed.	But	this	failure	had	no	direct	negative	consequences	for	his	brilliant	historical	work. Fortunately,	in	neither	case	did	the	alck	of	success	regarding	the	philosophical	handling	of relativism	weaken	the	quality	and	interest	of	the	sociological-historical	case	studies. Literature Adler,	M.	(1919),Georg	Simmels	Bedeutung	für	die	Geistesgeschichte,	Leipzig:	Anzengruber. Bloor,	D.	(1973),	"Wittgenstein	and	Mannheim	on	the	Sociology	of	Mathematics",	Studies	in History	and	Philosophy	of	Science	4:	173-191. Bourdon,	R.	(1989),	"Die	Erkenntnistheorie	in	Simmels	'Philosophie	des	Geldes'",	Zeitschrift für	Soziologie	18:	413-425. Carlsnaess,	W.	(1981),	The	Concept	of	Ideology	and	Political	Analysis,	Westport:	Greenwood Press. Fitzi,	G.	(2002),	Soziale	Erfahrung	und	Lebensphilosophie:	Georg	Simmels	Beziehung	zu	Henri Bergson,	Konstanz:	UVK	Verlagsgesellschaft. 17 Frischeisen-Köhler,	M.	(1920),	"Georg-Simmel",	Kantstudien	24:	1-51. Gessner,	W.	(2003),	Der	Schatz	im	Acker:	Georg	Simmels	Philosophie	der	Kultur,	Weilerswist: Velbrück. Goodstein,	E.	S.	(2017),	Georg	Simmel	and	the	Disciplinary	Imaginary,	Stanford,	Cal.: Stanford	University	Press. Grünwald,	E.	(1934/1982),	"Systematische	Analyse	der	wissenssoziologischen	Theorien",	in Meja	and	Stehr	(1982),	681-747. (First	published	in	1934.) Hacking,	I.	(1995),	Rewriting	the	Soul:	Multiple	Personality	Disorder	and	the	Sciences	of Memory,	Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press. Horkheimer,	M.	(1930/1982),	"Ein	neuer	Ideologiebegriff",	in	Meja	and	Stehr	(1982),	47496. (First	published	in	1930.) Husserl,	E.	(1900/1970),	Logical	Investigations,	London:	Routledge	&	Kegan	Paul.	(The German	original	was	published	in	1900.) Kusch,	M.	(1999),	"Philosophy	and	the	Sociology	of	Knowledge",	Studies	in	History	and Philosophy	of	Science	30A:	651-86. Köhnke,	K.	C.	(1995),	Der	junge	Simmel	in	Theoriebeziehungen	und	sozialen	Bewegungen, Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp. Lessing,	T.	(1921/2012),	Geschichte	als	Sinngebung	des	Sinnlosen,	Bremen:	DOGMA.	(The German	original	was	published	in	1921.) Lukacs,	G.	(1923/2000),	History	and	Class	Consciousness:	Studies	in	Marxist	Dialectics, Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	The	MIT	Press.	(The	German	original	was	published	in	1923.) Mannheim,	K.	(1924/1964),	"Historismus",	in	Mannheim,	Wissenssoziologie:	Auswahl	aus dem	Werk,	Berlin:	Luchterhand,	246-307.	(The	German	original	was	published	in	1924.) 18 Mannheim,	K.	(1925/1986),	Conservatism:	A	Contribution	to	the	Sociology	of	Knowledge, London:	Routledge.	(The	German	original	was	published	in	1925.) Mannheim,	K.	(1931/1936),	Ideology	and	Utopia,	London:	Routledge	&	Kegan	Paul.	(The German	original	was	published	in	1931.) Merton,	R.	K.	(1938),	"Science,	Technology	and	Society	in	Seventeenth-Century	England", Osiris	4:	360-632. Meja,	V.	and	N.	Stehr	(eds.)	(1982),	Der	Streit	um	die	Wissenssoziologie,	2	vols.,	Frankfurt am	Main:	Suhrkamp. Nelson,	R.	D.	(1992),	"The	Sociology	of	Styles	of	Thought",	The	British	Journal	of	Sociology, Vol.	43:	25-54. Schantz,	R.	and	M.	Seidel	(eds.)	(2011),	The	Problem	of	Relativism	in	the	Sociology	of (Scientific)	Knowledge,	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp. Scheler,	M.	(1926/1960)	Die	Wissensformen	und	die	Gesellschaft,	Bern	und	München: Francke.	(The	German	original	was	published	in	1926.) Seidel,	M.	(2011),	"Karl	Mannheim,	Relativism	and	Knowledge	in	the	Natural	Sciences	–	A Deviant	Interpretation",	in	Schantz	and	Seidel	(2011),	183-214. Simmel,	G.	(1892/1989),	"Die	Probleme	der	Geschichtsphilosophie",	in	Simmel, Gesamtausgabe,	vol.	2,	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp,	297-421.	(The	German	original	was published	in	1892.) Simmel,	G.	(1892-3/1989),	Einleitung	in	die	Moralwissenschaft,	in	Simmel,	Gesamtausgabe, vol.	3,	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp.	(The	German	original	was	published	in	1892-3.) Simmel,	G.	(1900/2004),	The	Philosophy	of	Money,	London:	Routledge.	(The	German original	was	published	in	1900.) 19 Simmel,	G.	(2005),	Briefe	1912-1918,	Jugendbriefe,	in	Simmel,	Gesamtausgabe,	vo.	23, Frankfurt	am	Main:	Suhrkamp. Sombart,	W.	(1902),	Der	moderne	Kapitalismus,	Berlin:	Duncker	&	Humblot. Spengler,	O.	(1918/1991),	The	Decline	of	the	West,	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. Spencer,	H.	(1867),	First	Principles,	London:	Williams	and	Norgate. Steizinger,	J.	(2015),	"In	Defence	of	Epistemic	Relativism:	The	Concept	of	Truth	in	Georg Simmel's	Philosophy	of	Money",	in	C.	Kanzian,	J.	Mitterer,	K.	Neges	(eds.)	(2015),	Realism	– Relativism	–	Constructivism,	Kirchberg	am	Wechsel:	Austrian	Ludwig	Wittgenstein	Society, 300-302. Troeltsch,	E.	(1922/1977),	Der	Historismus	und	seine	Probleme,	in	Troeltsch,	Gesammelte Schriften,	vol.	3,	Aalen:	Scientia	Verlag. Weber,	A.	(1923),	Die	Not	der	geistigen	Arbeiter,	München,	Leipzig:	Duncker	&	Humblot. Weber,	M.	(1904-5/1930),	The	Protestant	Ethic	and	the	Spirit	of	Capitalism,	London	and Boston:	Unwin	Hyman. Weber,	M.	(1908/1970),	"Georg	Simmel	as	Sociologist",	Social	Research	39:	155-163. Weinstein,	D.	and	M.	A.	Weinstein	(1993),	Postmodern(ized)	Simmel,	London	and	New	York: Routledge.